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Jure Simoniti
Hegel’s Logic as the Exposition of God 
from the End of the World
Abstract   The article attempts to reconstruct the logical space within which, 
at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic, “being” and “nothing” are entitled to emerge 
and receive their names. In German Idealism, the concept of “being” is linked 
to the form of a proposition; Fichte grounds a new truth-value on the absolute 
thesis of the “thetical judgement”. And the article’s first thesis claims that Hegel 
couldn’t have placed “being” at the beginning of this great system, if the ground 
of its logical space had not been laid out by precisely those shifts of German 
Idealism that posited the ontological function of the judgement. At the same 
time, the abstract negation, the absence of a relation and sufficient reason 
between “being” and “nothing”, reveals a structure of an irreducibly dual begin-
ning. The logical background of this original duality could be constituted by 
the invention of the “transcendental inter-subjectivity” in German Idealism, 
manifested, for instance, in Hegel’s life-and-death struggle of two self-con-
sciousnesses. The second thesis therefore suggests that “being” and “nothing” 
are elements of the logical space, established in concreto in a social situation 
of (at least) two subjects one of whom poses an affirmative statement and the 
other negates it abstractly. From here, one could draw out the coordinates of a 
sphere by the name of “public” whose structure is defined by the invalidation of 
two basic laws of thought, the law of non-contradiction and the principle of 
sufficient reason. The article shows how only the statements capable of absorb-
ing negation, of sustaining a co-existence of affirmation and its symmetrical, 
abstract negation, can climb the ladder of public perceptibility and social impact.
Keywords: Hegel, being, nothing, negation, intersubjectivity, public
The history of philosophy could be interpreted as a series of attempts to 
secure the priority of being over nothing. At the beginning of Western 
ontology, Parmenides states that “there is Being, but nothing is not”. 
(Parmenides 1965: 54; fragm. VI.) Plato is less rigid on the matter, but he 
nevertheless claims “both that that which is not somehow is, and then 
again that that which is somehow is not”, (Plato 1997: 262; Sophist 241d) 
thereby reducing nonbeing to a forced admission. Spinoza begins his 
Ethics with the definition of the “self-caused” as “that whose essence 
involves existence; or that whose nature can be conceived only as exist-
ing”. (Spinoza 2002: 217 ((E I., d 1)) And Leibniz poses arguably the most 
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famous philosophical question of all: “why is there something rather than 
nothing? For nothing is simpler and easier than something”. (Leibniz 1989: 
210) But Hegel seems to stand out from this tradition. He opens his great 
system with a simple assertion: “Being, pure being”, and “nothing, pure 
nothing”. Thus, the issue might be raised: If philosophy had traditionally 
been regarded as some sort of “guardian of being”, what changed with 
Hegel so that philosophy became just as much a “placeholder of nothing” 
as it is a “shepherd of being”? In what way the conditions of truth trans-
formed in order for both being and nothing to start representing the 
entrance door to the kingdom of knowledge?
The categories of being and nothing have always hung suspended between 
symmetry and asymmetry, between logification and ontologization. Onto-
logically speaking, i.e., within the cosmic asymmetry of something van-
quishing nothing, being seems to possess added value as compared to 
nothing. But logically speaking, being is still in need of the “question of 
being”, the Seinsfrage, and thus evidently requires to be somehow justi-
fied in the face of nothingness. It is not at all clear whether there is 
(ontologically) more being than nothing in the world, or they are (logic-
ally) equilibrated. Are then being and nothing elements of the onto-
logical structure of the world, or only hypostases of the two most pro-
saic grammatical operations, affirmation and negation?
The history of philosophy could also be recounted as an incessant inter-
play between almost literary sublimations on the one hand and sober 
logical disenchantments on the other. Philosophy, well aware of the dis-
comforting logical parity of nothing, compensated and repaid the credit 
of the ontological priority of being with a number of philosophical myths, 
making use of dramatized, phantasmagorical narratives: in Parmenides, 
the epiphany of Being was introduced by mares carrying him to the god-
dess of truth, Plato invented the myth of anamnesis, Leibniz depicts God 
in the hall of spirits, Hegel conceives his Logic as “the exposition of God 
as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite 
spirit”, (Hegel 2010: 29) and even in Heidegger, the ontological difference 
is temporalized in a history of Eregnis and Gestell. However, the history 
of philosophy also offers a series of contrary diagnoses which dismiss this 
epic, theatrical manoeuvres to ground the “wonder of Being”. Parmenides’ 
Being was exposed by Aristotle as merely the first inkling of the logic ally 
still inarticulate principle of contradiction. Plato’s ideas has time and 
again been read simply as hypostases of linguistic signs, of universal 
notions. Leibniz’s theodicy, the “best of all worlds”, could be explained 
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as a logical deduction of the principle of sufficient reason. And a similar 
“disillusioning” method can now be applied to Hegel’s being and nothing 
at the beginning of his Logic. Let us finally venture to reduce Hegel’s “God 
as he is before the creation of the world” to a formal, logical, perhaps ulti-
mately even banal operation.
Anacoluthon, proposition, and being
The question this article aims to answer is: What is the logical space in 
which the concepts of “being” and “nothing” could presume to function 
as the beginning of the system as well as of the world, its creation? 
What guided the hand of the author to choose and write down these 
two notions precisely?
The opening of The Science of Logic should have been the most pure, 
modest, vacuous, abstract, nondescript beginning conceivable. And yet, 
it is not devoid of presuppositions. At this point, namely, we have already 
worked through and completed the path of the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
We are now situated at the standpoint of the Spirit, and, as spiritual beings, 
we have internalized all the possible “mediations” of society, culture, 
history, inter-subjectivity, and, first and foremost, language. In language, 
the richness of Spirit has already performed its basic logification, or, as 
Hegel puts it in the preface to the second edition:
The forms of thought are first set out and stored in human language 
[...]. In everything that the human being has interiorized, in everything 
that in some way or other has become for him a representation, in 
whatever he has made his own, there has language penetrated … 
(Hegel 2010: 12)
Hence, the seemingly guileless, “immediate” beginning of Hegel’s Logic, 
this “[p]ure knowledge, thus withdrawn into this unity”, this “simple im-
mediacy” (Hegel 2010: 47), is itself only a pinnacle and a result of the 
most massive and extensive process of “mediation”. To this essentially 
produced, and not given, immediacy Hegel bestows the name: pure being. 
Hegel’s being is thus not the grand, smooth, and homogenous sphere of 
Parmenides, but an emergent spiritual entity: it is the point at which the 
mediation at its highest reach switches to immediacy. And for this reason, 
this simple being does not come alone, but rather in a pair: “Being, pure 
being”, is immediately, i.e., without any mediation whatsoever, followed 
by “Nothing, pure nothingness”. (Hegel 2010: 59)
Here, at the beginning of all beginnings, there are two acts of positing 
without a noun to attach a predicate to a subject. As is generally known, 
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Hegel opens his Logic with an anacoluthon, a Satzbruch, a broken, un-
finished sentence. The omission of predication is programmatic. In the 
first edition of The Science of Logic in 1812, in one of the notes which he 
abandons in the second edition, Hegel performs a subtraction of possible 
predicates of being. He begins with “Being is absolute”, reduces it to the 
tautology “Being is being”, takes away the predicate, “Being is”, and fi-
nally cuts off even the copula. The “being” of the beginning, he insists, 
can only be satzlos ohne Behauptung oder Prädikat:
Pure being or rather only being; propositionless without assertion or 
predicate. Or else, the assertion went back to intending [Meinen]. 
Being is only an exclamation which has its meaning solely in the 
subject. (Hegel 1812: 36; hereinafter translation mine)
And the question arises: What is the motive behind such vehement de-
predicatization of the beginning? Why being is trimmed down to a mere 
exclamation beyond assertion?
The easiest answer would be that any sentence is by definition pre dic-
ative, that it instates a difference between the subject and the predicate 
and hence determines the subject; being, on the other hand, must remain 
pure and indeterminate. Already Plato claimed in Parmenides that the 
proposition “Being is One” contains two elements, being and One: “oneness 
always possesses being and being always possesses oneness. So, since it 
always proves to be two, it must never be one”. (Plato 1997: 376; Parmenides 
142e-143a) However, Hegel’s anti-propositionality may have a deeper reason. 
Why then does Hegel begin his Logic with an anacoluthon? Why does it 
seem as if he needed to protect being from the sentence form? Why does 
his system begin with “being, pure being”, without tolerating a copula and 
a predicate at its side, and why does this being then switch to “nothing, 
pure nothingness”?
The first triad of Hegel’s Logic, “Being – Nothing – Becoming”, is presum-
ably the most interpreted part of the book, and many interpreters warn 
us against reading too much into this simple, utterly empty inception. 
With Hegel, so it is said, the opening never contains the matrix for the 
subsequent development of the system.ͱ Rather, we have to be patient and 
wait until die Sache selbst, the thing itself, will unveil at the end, as a 
result. Perhaps the beginning of Hegel’s Logic is precisely uninterpretable. 
1  This, for instance, is the stance of Dieter Henrich in “Anfang und Methode der 
Logik”. (Henrich 1967: 73–94) In Slovenia, the thesis that we should not overestimate 
the abstract beginning of the Logic was advocated by Zdravko Kobe in his article 
“Much Ado about Being and Nothing”. (Kobe 2013: 83–131)
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We will try to show, however, that this humble prelude may not possess any 
immediate meaning per se, but that the two names of its meaninglessness 
are not chosen by coincidence.
Our thesis claims that there are historical and logical reasons to place 
being and nothing at the origin of the system of philosophy: this begin-
ning may be empty “metaphysically”, but it is not devoid of systemic, 
structural, semantic, and metaphorical pre-determinations. With the 
concepts of Spirit, language, mediation, immediacy, exclamation, and 
propositionlessness, Hegel establishes a semantic coordinate system 
on the fertile ground of which the seeds of being and nothing will be 
able to sprout in the first place. There occurred a major shift in the 
conceptualization of truth, the status of the subject, the theory of judg-
ment, perhaps even in the understanding of culture, in order for two 
most abstract, negatively related concepts to be able to actually function 
as a beginning.
First, let us detect an interesting “historical” coincidence. Hegel expli citly 
stresses that being is satzlos, as if this Satz was some kind of a trau-
matic kernel of being. And, what is more, he conceives of being as satzlos 
at the peak of the philosophical movement called German Idealism which 
originated precisely from the essential insight into an equiprimordiality 
of being and the proposition form. Kant famously states in his Critique of 
Pure Reason:
Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that 
could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing 
or of certain determinations in themselves. In the logical use it is 
merely the copula of a judgment. (Kant 1998: 567 (KrV A 598/B 626))
Being, das Sein, is now a mere position; for the real “existence” of a thing 
an entire context of experience is needed. With Kant’s being as positing, 
one of the basic concepts of German Idealism is born, Fichte’s positing, 
Setzen. “Positing” is an intermediary concept which connects being and 
proposition and provides the sentence with reality. Positing, Setzen, be-
comes the first impulse of being, and what is posited, gesetzt, is a sen-
tence or proposition, ein Satz. In Fichte, the need for the Kantian divide 
between being as copula and being as existence becomes obsolete, since, 
after the thing-in-itself has been disposed of, being becomes a “real 
predicate”, the copula becomes the raison d’être, so to speak, and the 
proposition is now the most original logical form of ontology. If German 
Idealism had its own gospel, it would probably start with: “In the begin-
ning was the Proposition, and the Proposition was with the Being, and 
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the Being was the Proposition”.Ͳ One could say without exaggeration that 
German philosophy between Fichte, if not Kant, and Hegel invented the 
ontological function of the proposition. And the proposition form brings 
to the scene a new quantum of truth: the punctual creation of judging, 
the emergence of new facts that were not there before.
In Fichte, all judgments, analytical and synthetic, are only possible on 
the ground of the first positing, die absolute Thesis, which is by no means 
satzlos, as in Hegel, but can only be preformed by the third judgment 
form, the thetical judgment:
The thetical judgment is the one in which something does not equal 
something else and is not opposed to it, but is rather posed only as 
equal to itself [...]. The original highest judgment of this kind is I am 
in which nothing is being said about the I, but only the place of the 
predicate is infinitely left blank for the possible determination of the 
I. (Fichte 1845/1846: 117)
The original thetical judgment I am is not a reference to a fact, a descrip-
tion of an experience, but a constitution of the fact through the act of 
positing a proposition. Fichte thus discovers a proposition which, by its 
mere emergence, sets the conditions of its own truth value, a proposition 
which makes itself true by means of being stated. In a word, he discovers 
the truth dimension which, in the 20th century, will be called perform-
ative by Austin and an institutional fact by Searle.ͳ
With a thetical judgment, Fichte came across an unusual phenomenon 
where, by saying something, one inadvertently creates a new world. Fichte 
may still have “burdened” every judgment with the “original substance” 
of the I, but he was nevertheless the first to point out the essentially sup-
plemental life of truth: he detected the absolute excess of every proposition 
over being, the fact that the world never needed that surplus, so that, by 
judgments being uttered, new truth values actually emerge. And this is 
the point where the first thesis of this article can finally be articulated: 
the form of the thetical judgment opened the new logical space of truth 
without which it is impossible to understand Hegel’s “being, pure being”.
2  This a priori “propositionalization” of reality was obviously traumatic enough for 
Hölderlin and Schelling having to meet it with the first heresy, which posited the 
absolute, pre-discursive being before the first proposition. For every judgment, Ur-
Theil, is an ur-division, Ur-Theilung. This subsequent justification of being before the 
proposition might well be an expression of opposing the excessive power of judgment, 
bestowed upon it by Kant and Fichte.
3  The other Fichte’s example of a thetical judgment is: “Man is free”, whereby this 
statement is not a case of stating facts but a concealed imperative: “Man must infin-
itely approach to an in itself unattainable freedom.” (Fichte 1845/1846: 118)
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To return to Hegel’s Satzlosigkeit of the beginning, he seems at first sight 
to have suspended the very tendency of the movement whose heir he 
was. As the first impulse of thought, “being” is pre-propositional. Hegel 
himself claims that we are not asserting, just meaning or intending.ʹ But 
if we interpret this “being” as an Ursachverhalt, ur-state, we could all too 
easily be tempted to understand it as a positive image, an experience, 
Erlebnis, a self-evidence, or even as some sort of primal cosmic fact. 
However, the impetus of our reading will oppose precisely the danger of 
understanding Hegel’s being as the first intuition, the primordial inner 
sense of oneself, or even the big-bang of the universe, the first case of 
everything. “Being, pure being” is not any of these hermeneutic, phe-
nomenological, existential, or even metaphysical entities. It is, as we shall 
see, a purely logical product.
How, then, should we explain this sudden apparition of “pure being”? 
Let us count up again the conditions of its emergence. First, against in-
terpreting being as an ur-fact or a pre-propositional intuition, Hegel 
points out that we are always already situated within the sphere of Spirit 
and that everything is already permeated with language. Second, Hegel 
begins his Logic at the point where the totality of mediations transforms 
into a new quality, a new immediacy; we have put the whole spiritual 
history behind us, now we produce something new. Third, in German 
Idealism the category of “being” enters a necessary relation with the act 
of positing, of making a proposition; in this union of being and propos-
itionality, a new truth value is produced: every proposition generates a 
creative surplus over the given being. Fourth, Hegel states “being” by way 
of exclamation and without a predicate. Some recognize in this non-
predicative anacoluthon a pre-propositional intuition, but perhaps the 
meaning of this interjection of “being” is exactly the opposite. Since being 
is a product of Spirit, it seems reasonable to assume that the beginning 
of the Logic does not perform a reconstruction of a pre-propositional sim-
plicity, but rather evokes a form of recess, leap, or even event. Instead of 
representing a simple anteriority, it is far more plausible that being is ori-
ginally a supplement. The “reason” of being does not consist in something 
4  “Being” has often been interpreted as an analytically deduced fact before uttering, 
a surrogate for the intellectual intuition, a sort of Ursachverhalt, ur-state. According 
to Koch, “being” has a “form of a pre-propositional intuition” (Koch 2000: 145, here-
inafter translation mine) and is a retroactively constructed “fact of the first thought”: 
“In retrospect it turns out, on the basis of inserting nothing between pure being and 
becoming, that pure being is an imaginary vanishing point of pure thought.” (Koch 
2000: 153) Being and nothing are thus retroactive logical deductions of the fact that 
we make judgments about a certain existence.
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below or behind the possible proposition but rather in the emancipating 
surface. Bernard Bourgeois, for instance, claims that the beginning of 
the Logic expresses the decision of pure thinking and demands a creative 
intervention of the philosophizing subject: “Hegel’s Reason is essentially 
’decision,’” he claims. (Bourgeois 1992: 132; translation mine). A system 
of German Idealism always commences by assuming a new dimension, 
by instating an event, a sudden impact of something unconditional and 
absolute.͵ In philosophy, the world begins to begin with a bang. And the 
only commonplace, trivial, non-metaphysical form that conforms to 
these conditions is a proposition. At the beginning, a bang occurs, a 
somersault, something undeducible; and this does not occur before the 
first proposition is uttered, but through the proposition and with it. At 
this point of a thorough “spiritualization”, even “languaging” of being, 
the only “fact” which Hegel’s system could detect at all is the mere thetical 
emergence of a proposition. The system now only “skims the cream” of 
the absolutely immediate, supplemental, eventful, and new surface of a 
proposition – and it names it “being”. For, at the beginning, there is no 
other being than this mere excess.
What we are trying to point out is a crucial similarity of conditions for the 
emergence of two entities: Hegel’s “being” and the “thetical factum”, i.e., the 
fact of a proposition being uttered. Both of them are spiritual (even lin-
guistic), absolutely immediate, creative, and novel. The “thetical factum” 
is the one and only form distinguished by being a pure positing, a coin-
cidence of the conditional and the unconditional, an element of excess 
over the existent and given, an unnecessary addition of a new fact which 
presupposes the totality of mediations of Spirit in order to emerge, but at 
the same time functions as an unequivocal immediacy of a new event.
To resume and put it in more modest terms, Hegel could not have con-
ceived of this primary “being”, if the basic mind shift, taking place in German 
Idealism, did not first open the logical space for the ontological function 
of a proposition. Only within a mentality which finally recognized the 
propositional positing and discovered a supplemental emergence of being, 
of truth no longer being attached to facticity, experience, and the givenness 
of nature, is it possible to develop a sense for that surplus dimension of 
truth which Hegel names “being, pure being”.
5  The general tendency of German Idealism is to presuppose a certain creatio ex 
nihilo at the beginning, a self-creation, a positing without ground or reason. The first 
act is precisely not deducible from the principle of sufficient reason but asserts itself 
against it.
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According to our thesis, the word “being” does not refer to any thing, 
given fact, state of affairs, intuition, experience, or principle, but solely to 
the absolute immediacy of positing, a minimal event whose logical space 
was established by the theticity of a proposition. But why, then, can this 
“being” only be articulated with an anacoluthon? Why is it satzlos if it 
only expresses the gist of a proposition? Hegel’s “being, pure being” must 
always be understood as an answer to Fichte’s I, the true origin of the 
thetical judgment. In Fichte, the fact of theticity is immanently bound 
to the ur-substance of the I as a self-consciousness. Fichte’s thetical judg-
ment is still committed to a “worldview”, a deductive ontology based on 
the first principle and caught up in the space of imperatives and infinite 
tasks. The self-creation of the I is “loaded” with subjective idealism, 
activism, tendentiousness, asymptotic approach, overcoming hurdles, 
infinite growth, i.e., with the typical imaginarium of Fichte’s philosophy. 
The aim of Hegel’s “being, pure being”, however, was to liberate a certain 
emergent and supplemental truth production from any determinate sub-
stance and its necessary subtext. It could almost be said that, since Hegel 
aimed at capturing the very dimension of truth which emerges by way 
of a proposition, he could not condemn it to any particular proposition, 
to this or that utterance, for every specific, articulate judgment would 
already name a subject, thus inaugurating a substance from which the 
truth value would derive. If we read Hegel against Fichte, Hegel’s “being” 
seems merely to skim the cream off the top of theticity, posed by the 
I am, without also scooping the substance of the I. Hegel’s first “element” 
strips off the surface and separates it from the act whereby it came into 
existence in the first place.Ͷ
In other words, Fichte still founded a Realontologie on his thetical judg-
ment, while Hegel seems to nurture the sensibility to capture some 
other, superficial effects which arise with every proposition. Hegel’s sys-
tem is not one to rest on the point of its origin and deduce everything 
from it but rather pursues the eventfulness of truth, i.e., the elements of 
pure immediacy which sprout up after the whole world has been con-
verted to the mediation of Spirit. Hegel’s “truth” consists in results rather 
6  If we place the two great “beginnings” of German Idealism, Fichte’s “I am” and 
Hegel’s “being”, in a fraction, we can see that it is “am” and “being” that cancel each 
other out, and it is the I that remains as an alien element. “Being” is thus not the 
substitute for the “I”, as it has been, to Hegel’s great regret, often implied, but the 
substitute for the verb “am”. And this “being” is solely a transcript of the emergent 
dimension of the “am”, the dimension of positing without possessing its own subject. 
It is a distillation of the pure theticity which occurs in a certain “am”, but without this 
“am” being a predicate of a certain “I”.
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than in roots, in effects rather than in causes, in purposes rather than 
in motives, in ascents rather than in descents, in emergences rather 
than in reductions. And “being” is a name for the very X which, already 
at the beginning, designates the Hegelian inversion of the timeline, the 
fact that only the end will be able to set the conditions of possibility of 
the beginning. It is an anti-origin and it represents precisely this sup-
plemental nature of being. Of course, our thesis is only plausible if we 
presume that Hegel himself was unable to comprehend the real scope 
of his operation and thus regrettably wrapped up the categories of his 
Logic in the pathos of God’s thoughts before the creation of the world. 
But after the linguistic turn, we can finally recognize this enigmatic yet 
void and bland “being” as what it really is: being signifies the lack of 
the highest principle, the absence of a word from the meaning of which 
the world could be deduced. There is no substance made to measure 
the beginning, no Ego, God, Idea, or Element, for the world begins with 
a surplus. Hegel’s Logic is, if anything, the exposition of God as he is at 
the end of the world.
Nothing, mere “no”, and abstract negation
However, this beginning is most feeble and can only be kept alive by what 
comes next. “Being, pure being” is, on the one hand, void enough to be 
deemed to be something new, a supplement which is not deducible from 
a previous state of affairs, but, on the other hand, it is also too void to 
leave any trace in the given state. After all, a proposition dies away after 
some trepidation in the air and never comes back. In like manner, the 
absolute immediacy of being could not have caused any effect if there 
was no logical resonance which would detect it as an event. The next step 
Hegel takes is precisely to elaborate the logical space in which the effects 
of being could be captured, so that this being would not seep away like 
a shout in the woods, an utterance heard by no one.
Therefore being never comes alone; it necessarily comes in pairs with 
nothing. If being is a mere supplement, then a membrane of sensibility 
is needed to perceive it and to recognize the fact that beyond deduction, 
cause, effect, and sufficient reason something is nevertheless taking place. 
The immateriality of being must trigger an echo in order to be; being 
would be nothing if it weren’t resounded by nothing. And if we claimed 
that Hegel’s being could only have emerged in the logical space of thetic-
ity, now, the second great question arises: What is the logical space of 
the emergence of nothing?
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The first thing to be considered is the fact that there is no deduction 
between the elements. Nothing is not derived from being, it only, so to 
speak, dashes at being. In the first edition, Hegel claims:
Being as it is entirely for itself is the indeterminate; hence, it has no 
relation to the other; thus it seems that one cannot proceed from this 
beginning, namely from itself, and the proceeding can only occur 
when something foreign is related to it from the outside. The proceed-
ing that being is the same as nothing appears as a second, absolute 
beginning… (Hegel 1812: 36)
From being nothing follows, and precisely for this reason, nothing is 
necessary. It represents the fact that being possesses no inside from 
where the progress could be possible. The basic function of nothing is 
to express the pure exteriority of its addition.
We shall never understand the opening of Hegel’s Logic if we dive into 
the semantics of the words “being” and “nothing”. Instead, we have to 
understand them as non-significant elements of an irreducibly double 
beginning. There is no beginning, if there are not two beginnings, and 
their duality is extrinsic, straightforward, and not deducible from a single 
principle. Duality is not a trivial quality of being and nothing, a fact of 
their addition. Rather, being and nothing are essentially trivial elements 
of their original duality. It is not the case that the entire universe rests 
upon the shoulders of primary elements, which, accidentally, are two by 
number, but rather the case that the system needs to begin with an irre-
ducible duality, and, then, points out the only two elements which could 
carry and express it. It is the presupposed duality which retroactively 
selects the two factors as fulfilling the one condition: that they are inde-
terminate enough for the reflexion between them to be utterly void and 
abstract, so that they do not enter a relation, do not reflect, determine, 
and abolish each other, but rather only switch over into one another. And 
it seems that only being and nothing fulfil this systemic requirement to 
represent an absolute and abstract negation without any possibility of 
mediation. As Zdravko Kobe puts it: »Being is the indeterminate, and 
nothing is neither the truth nor the negation and particularly not a subla-
tion of being.« (Kobe 2013: 126; translation mine)
The most authentic meaning of being and nothing should perhaps be 
translated into a slogan: One beginning is already two beginnings. And 
here, the famous dictum from Hegel’s Phenomenology comes to mind: 
“Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-con-
sciousness.” (Hegel 1977: 110) Or even: “A self-consciousness exists for a 
self-consciousness.” (Hegel 1977: 110) The first appearance of the logical 
863
  THE SLOVENE RE-ACTUALIZATION OF HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY
space of this “irreducible duality” in Hegel is the master-slave dialectic, 
the two self-consciousnesses, the emergence of inter-subjectivity. But 
here Hegel is merely following a broader tendency of his period. One of 
the greatest achievements of German Idealism was the discovery of the 
transcendental dimension of inter-subjectivity. It was Fichte who main-
tained that, in order to become a rational being, one first needs to be 
treated as such by another of the same kind:
the other was compelled already, in his original influence upon me, 
compelled as a rational being (i.e. bound by consistency) to treat me as 
a rational being; and indeed, that he was compelled to do so by me… […] 
[O]riginal relation is already a reciprocal interaction. (Fichte 2000: 69)
Here, the interaction between two rational beings is prior to the ration-
ality of any of the two. The relation precedes the existence of its parts – 
this might be called the “logical space of inter-subjectivity”.
Now, our thesis claims the following. Inter-subjectivity forms the logical 
background against which the duality of being and nothing must inad-
vertently be interpreted. If we derived being from the logical space of the 
thetical factum, being and nothing can now be derived from the logical 
space constituted by two subjects, i.e., by inter-subjectivity.
The parallels do not end there. At the beginning of the Logic, there are 
being, nothing, abstract negation, and irreducible duality. In the Phenomen-
ology’s formation of self-consciousness, there are life, death, sacrifice, and 
two self-consciousnesses (i.e. master and slave). The immediate passage 
from life to death in the notorious “staking one’s life” (Hegel 1977: 114) is 
thus not an expression of biological facticity, but a product of the external 
negation of struggle in which one’s life can be put at stake solely for the 
eyes of another subject. The winner in this game is the one capable of as-
suming the logical form of abstract negation: here, “death” does not mean 
“acceptance of one’s mortality”, “reconciliation with the entropy of mat-
ter”, “enduring fate”, etc., but an experience of the logical equivalence of 
life and death. And for this experience of sacrificing life and risking death, 
essentially two subjects are needed. Viewed in this light, the master is the 
first figure of abstract negation in Hegel’s philosophy. Similarly, in the 
Logic, being cannot be converted to nothing without the presupposition 
of exteriority and non-reflexivity of two irreducible positions:
But the issue first of all is not the form of opposition, which is at the 
same time the form of reference, but the abstract, immediate nega-
tion, the nothing purely for itself, negation devoid of reference – and 
this can also be expressed, if one so wishes, simply by saying “nothing”. 
(Hegel 2010: 60)
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The original is more unequivocal: “die beziehungslose Verneinung, – was 
man, wenn man will, auch durch das bloße: Nicht ausdrücken könnte.” 
(Hegel 1990: 73) The relation between being and nothing is not a “nothing”, 
a substance of nothingness, but even less, das bloße Nicht, “the mere not”. 
If we take into account the logical space of irreducibly two subjects and 
implement between the two the abstract relation of “not”, then it is not 
going too far to picture this situation figuratively: as the one subject saying 
“yes” and the other “no”, or, more precisely, the one stating an affirmative 
proposition and the other negating it by merely adding a “not”. The only 
possible relation to carry, to perform, to stage the exteriority, unrelatedness, 
non-mediability, and abstractness of the negation is a situation of two 
subjects, the one passing an affirmative judgment and the other saying 
“no” merely by virtue of the irreducibility of his logical position.
Perhaps the crucial entrance exam, a rite of passage of a sort, at the door 
of inter-subjectivity consists in the test whether one is capable of thinking 
and enduring “nothing in itself”, the immediate negation, the mere “not” 
coming from the outside, just so, for no reason, and without being dedu-
cible from the affirmative stance. Are we capable of facing Goethe’s Mephis-
topheles saying: “I am the spirit that negates”? (Goethe 1990: 161) And, in 
a way, the touchstone of achieving self-consciousness is structurally sim ilar 
to that of entering logical thinking: the consciousness had to risk death in 
order to become self-conscious, and the subject of logical thinking
ought to raise his mind to this abstract universality in which it is in 
fact indifferent to him whether the hundred dollars, whatever the 
quantitative relation that they might have to his financial state, are or 
are not; just as it would be indifferent to him whether he himself is or 
is not, that is, whether he is or is not in finite life … (Hegel 2010: 65)
Thus, the grand opening of the Logic may be interpreted merely as a 
discourse of two stances which have already dissociated from their finite 
necessities and concerns of life and risked their “semantic death”. In this 
view, Hegel’s Logic is a discourse of the master, a discourse of the unin-
terested, pure thought, but with an essential addition: the master is a 
logically unstable position in need of another master, standing opposite 
to him as the subject of the abstract negation. Therefore, the Logic is a 
discourse of two masters.
The logical space of a new truth form
If we count up a few conditions, the function of the proposition form in 
German Idealism, the invention of inter-subjectivity in that period, the 
necessary duality of two elements at the beginning of the Logic, the relation 
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of the external, unmediated, abstract negation between the two, the first 
appearance of this kind of irreducible duality in Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic, then, it seems, being and nothing can be interpreted as elements 
of the logical space which unfolds within a social situation where a pro-
position is posited while automatically provoking its own negation. Our 
thesis can be expressed in more modest terms: only an inter-subjective 
situation in which an affirmation appears simultaneously with the nega-
tion and is logically equiprimordial with it, corresponds to the same 
conditions to which Hegel’s being and nothing must abide. These condi-
tions are, above all, three: first, the concomitance of mediation and im-
mediacy (a proposition presupposes a comprehensive adoption of the 
sphere of Spirit), second, the relation of abstract negation (expressed 
most paradigmatically by the “mere not” of the propositional negation), 
and, third, the irreducible duality (since affirmation and negation de-
mand two subjects to be uttered by).
The primary objective of this article is to prove that being and nothing are 
not simply elements of a given universe, but necessarily fundamentals of a 
new logical space, outlined and contrived by the form of inter-subjectivity. 
There are a number of hints, perhaps even of small argumentative lapses, 
occurring to Hegel somewhat underhandedly, which suggest that being and 
nothing should not be read as elements of a physical, cosmological onto logy. 
Of course, even Hegel cannot refrain, in the third and fourth remark, from 
reducing these two “qualities” within the framework of the physics of quant-
ities. “There is nothing”, he says, “which is not an intermediary state between 
being and nothing”. (Hegel 2010: 80) And yet, in his definition of “becoming”, 
Hegel stresses the essentially perfect tense of this relation:
Pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same. The truth is neither 
being nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over into nothing 
and nothing into being – “has passed over”, not passes over. (Hegel 
2010: 59–60)
Here, Hegel seems to oppose Fichte’s third category of limitation as “pos-
iting of a quantity”. Hence, he makes explicit that the relation of being and 
nothing should not be thought of in terms of quantitative dilutions of one 
part within the other, but, first and foremost, as the logical form of pure 
leaping over, of the contraposition of two elements which provoke each 
other without allowing any continuous, gradual intermediate states, of 
persisting at the extreme ends without any possibility of meeting halfway. 
Being and nothing are anything but the first elements of pre-Socratic 
cosmologies; there is no relation of conditioning, originating, germinating, 
merging, and compounding between them:
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Thus it is inadmissible to say: nothing is the ground of being, or being 
is the ground of nothing; nothing is the cause of being, and so forth; 
or, the transition into nothing can have occurred only under the con-
dition that something is, or the transition into being only under the 
condition of non-being. (Hegel 2010: 78)
In order to truly grasp the two elements, we must presuppose a sphere of 
being converting into nothing fully and without reason. An entirely new 
logical space is opened, suspending the two central logical principles of 
classical logic, law of non-contradiction and principle of sufficient reason.
We are entering here a new range of truth, no longer based upon any 
“real ontology” of causes and effects, foundations and deductions, reas-
ons and consents, a range grounded solely on its own imminent emer-
gence. This is where truth becomes speculative instead of argumentative, 
representational, adequational, corresponding to a given reality etc. For 
it is precisely the speculative judgment which bears the “scarlet letter” 
of irreducible duality:
In this connection, we must observe right at the beginning that the 
proposition, in the form of a judgment, is not adept to express specu-
lative truths …
For the purpose of expressing the speculative truth, the defect is first 
remedied by adding the contrary proposition, namely “being and 
nothing are not the same”, which we also stated above. [...] This pro-
position is then undeniably asserted; but the statement is just as false 
as it is correct, for once one proposition is taken out of its speculative 
context, the other also must be given at least as much attention and 
articulation. (Hegel 2010: 66–67)
Here, we witness a coincidence of great logical beauty: not only does 
every speculative judgment display an a priori duality of affirmation and 
negation, but being and nothing exhibit the very same structure of the 
abstract negation: they seem to be the elementary embodiments of the 
copulas of two consecutive judgments forming a speculative truth. Hegel 
often played with the possibility of the subject becoming a predicate (as 
in the case of Julius Caesar), but here something even more spectacular 
occurs: the subjects, being and nothing, are shifted to the place of the 
copulas “are” and “are not”. Being and nothing of the entrance to the Logic 
thus in a way anticipate the insight that truth is originally and essen-
tially bi-propositional.
And we claim, of course, that only the transcendental dimension of inter-
subjectivity transcends the constraints of non-contradiction and suffi-
cient reason and allows this new conceptualization of logic. It is the 
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logical space of inter-subjectivity alone that has the structural capacity 
of trimming down the phenomenology of being and nothing to the 
minimum of pure and void extremization, where there is no determinate, 
content-related, relative, but only immediate, saltational, discreet, ab-
stract transition between the two.
Let us now summarize the qualities of this new logical space. First, the 
relation between being and nothing is one of perfective, not of imperfect-
ive transition. Second, between the two there is no relation of causality, 
conditioning, justification, or sufficient reason; the “leaping over” is auto-
matic and absolute. Third, the speculative judgment demands two pro-
positions concurrently. In order to “dramatize” this entirely logical situ-
ation, one could stage it as a speech process extending between a position 
and an opposition. In short, to bestow some flesh and blood to this ab-
stract form, one could imagine being as an instance of position, expressed 
in the fact of making an utterance, and nothing as an instance of opposi-
tion, appending “the mere not” to the affirmative stance. The logical 
space, within which being and nothing can make any sense at all, is thus 
the inter-subjective situation where an assertion and its negation appear 
simultaneously.
Our last thesis now claims that the only “environment” in which both 
affirmation and negation can live side by side equiprimordially and ir-
reducibly, the only environment able to detect and realize the absolute 
theticity of a proposition by means of perverting it into its abstract nega-
tion, is the public sphere. As we shall see, only propositions capable of 
co-existing with their own negations can climb the ladder of public per-
ceptibility and, from there, determine the new consistence of reality. It 
is the public sphere that transforms the abstract negation into an onto-
logical principle.
Being and nothing as elements 
of the theory of the public sphere
The true logical invention of the theory of propositions is the fact that 
no one really interpellated a proposition to enter the world; reality has 
no need of being redoubled in the sphere of the verbal. Propositions have 
no sufficient reason, rather they appear as supplements, creations, de-
cisions. However, it is the “spontaneous ideology” of propositions to 
believe in their deducibility from reality: they usually consider the facticity 
to which they refer or the pragmatic intent of the speaker to be the suffi-
cient reason for their own emergence. A proposition given in its singularity 
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is by default attached to a certain extra-discursive substance: to empirical 
knowledge, practical interest, information transfer, communicative pur-
pose, position of power, etc. This is why the first operation of theticity 
must be joined by the second operation of abstract negation. It is not 
until a proposition is faced with the negative version of its sense, until 
an “other” appears before me and merely negates what I have just said, 
that the emergent and eventful nature of every proposition comes to 
light. If we claim “We support public health system!”, our stance may 
still be suspected of advocating our private ends in the matter. However, 
when we expose ourselves to the possible negation which claims “We, 
however, support the privatization of the health system!”, an opposition 
whose momentary unabolishable possibility we must concede to, the 
bond of our particular interests is finally broken. Only by admitting the 
logical parity of negation, an “opinion” can become a “thought”.
A proposition must be negated in order for its original theticity to become 
manifest. The propositions that cannot bear their negations are merely 
empirical and pragmatic statements; they are like hundred dollars about 
which it is not indifferent whether they are or are not. The moment a 
proposition expresses a speculative truth, however, a complex subjective 
structure is established: the thetical statement is redoubled in its ex ternal 
negation, and this redoubling demands two subjects, constituting an 
antagonism. Or, in other words, Hegel’s form of speculative truth, the 
concomitance of affirmation and negation, is not an extravagance from 
the ivory tower of German metaphysics, but demonstrates a specific, 
concrete, even highly normal functioning of the public sphere.
We are reading Hegel’s Logic as “an exposition of God from the end of 
the world”, as “a discourse of two masters” who can already afford to state 
propositions in their pure excessive surplus, arranged only by the form 
of abstract negation. A very similar structure can be found in one of the 
most influential (and, needless to say, strikingly beautiful) theories of 
society, in Luhmann’s sociology. Just like Hegel defined the relation 
between being and nothing to be without cause, ground, or reason, 
Luhmann defines the “code” as a “rule of duplication” which ascribes a 
Nein-Fassung, “no-version”, to every Ja-Fassung, “yes-version”. And this 
ascription is performed in a precisely Hegelian manner: it is spontaneous, 
immediate, and has no reason. In one of the brilliant passages of his 
work, Luhmann speaks of
the system’s “disclosure” through linguistic coding, which means for 
us the doubling of expressive possibilities by a yes/no difference. 
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Thereby the system also creates a negative version of meaning for itself, 
to which nothing in the environment corresponds [italics mine] and 
which the system can control only by self-computation. [...]
The closure of a meaning system can thus be understood as the control 
of its own possibilities for negation while producing its own elements. 
Every transition implies a no (however indeterminate) and can be 
conditioned by conditioning its use. (Luhmann 1995: 444–445)
Luhmann shows an emergent causality of a proposition being uttered, 
whereby in the latency of the system, only by way of its self-computation, 
a negative version of meaning springs up, even though the real “state of 
affairs” never gave any reason for it. There is thus an utterly definite and 
even “normal” occurrence within a social system which, at a single stroke, 
invalidates both the law of non-contradiction and the principle of suf-
ficient reason.
Let us invent a specific example of Luhmann’s Nein-Fassung and imagine 
being in a relationship with a beautiful woman who believes that her 
beauty is an infinite credit which others must not cease to repay. Perhaps, 
in a period of her life she rejoiced in a few compliments, which usually 
take the form of an affirmative proposition: “You are beautiful!” But then 
the time comes when these flatteries run dry for no particular reason; 
perhaps one is weary of repeating the same statements over and over again. 
But within the system, the first affirmation automatically produces a 
latent negation, which may lack a sufficient reason, but it nevertheless 
subsists as a mere potentiality. It can happen that every time a compliment 
fails to appear, the beautiful woman starts asking herself if the opposite 
is now true, if she, in fact, has become ugly. The mere privation is already 
presumed to be a negation. In this emergent world situated beyond the 
principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason, the first affirmation 
creates a vacuum of possible negation, and a woman, having been flattered 
a few times in the past, now hovers over the abyss, which only hypochondria, 
jealousy, and self-praise can fill.
Luhmann, of course, preferred less self-indulgent cases of this spontaneous 
redoubling of the code and applied it rather to political systems. He divided 
the political code upon the dichotomy of progressive/conservative:
This double paradigm [...] assigns a counterpart to every political 
topic. [...] The code induces a downright forced duplication of the 
political reality; it belongs to the structure of political topics and is a 
condition of their politization. The moment a topic breaks out, the 
progressive and conservative forces appear ... (Luhmann 2011: 67; 
translation mine)
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Luhmann thus draws the abscissa and the ordinate of the “public sphere” 
in the fundamental opposition to its usual coordinates in the theories of 
communication and consensus. In the latter, every dissent has its purpose 
in the final consent, and every concurrency of affirmation and negation 
is “sublated” within the higher affirmation; naturally, the consensus is 
conceived in a way that it abides to the law of non-contradiction and is 
established by means of the best of sufficient reasons. Habermas’s uni-
versal pragmatics, together with other theories of communication, seems 
only to translate the principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason 
from the area of empirical reality, scientific facticity, and everyday prac-
tices to the domain of inter-subjectivity. Our objective, however, was to 
outline an entirely different landscape of the public discourse, following 
the principle of Hegel’s abstract, void negation, his “mere not”, and Luh-
mann’s self-computation of the system, his “however indeterminate no”. 
Here, affirmation and negation persist in the symmetry of equivalence, 
while their split takes place without any reason, without rational justi-
fication and argumentation.
Perhaps, there exists no public stance without also presupposing the 
position of the irreducible other whose place is in advance channelled 
by the matrix of abstract negation. And only within this “logical space” 
does inter-subjectivity become a concept and not merely a representation 
of manifold social phenomena. Its formal definition does not include 
the rich, particular realms of education, family, recognition, community, 
tradition, i.e., all the positive transfers of social customs and mores. Thus, 
the minimal “formal” definition goes as follows: the logical structure of 
inter-subjectivity is established where the mere negation, i.e., the cancel-
lation of the law of non-contradiction, figures as sufficient reason to in-
validate of the principle of sufficient reason. This means that within the 
space of inter-subjectivity, within the public sphere, no reason is ever 
needed to attach the “mere not” to any possible statement – and it is 
precisely by the force of this “not” that the affirmative statement will 
become truly “universal”, that is, of no other interest than public.
The public sphere is a complex logical space with its own regularities: 
only the propositions capable of simultaneously occupying both ex-
tremes, position and opposition, affirmation and symmetric negation, 
will reach the highest level of the hierarchy of public perceptibility. So-
ciety is constantly witnessing an emergence of a number of “positivities”, 
expressed in affirmative judgments: a train derailed, a new law was adopted, 
elections took place. However, to become the subject of public debate, a 
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topic must undergo a process of rigorous selection: only a matter about 
which it is possible to disagree within the form of symmetrical opposition 
can become publicly exploitable. The public sphere is not necessarily a 
neutral reservoir of all the issues relevant for some sort of “common 
good” or “general interest”. It is rather an articulate field of hierarchies 
organized by the selection which lets pass through the bottleneck only 
the elements that can be formalized in a symmetrically opposite way, i.e., 
the statements that allow the concomitance of affirmation and negation 
without becoming contradictory and thus logically abolishable. Perhaps, 
the general interest is not defined by what is best for all, but by what 
there is disagreement about.
Inter-subjectivity as an ontological principle
At first sight it may seem that we have only extrapolated one of the basic 
forms of Hegel’s Logic, the abstract negation,ͷ to the specific area of 
public discourse. And yet, we insist that there is something necessary 
and reciprocal about this extrapolation. The functioning of the public 
sphere is not only a heuristic illustration of Hegel’s being and nothing, but 
represents the opening of the space in which being an nothing become 
established as corner stones of a new universe.
It was our intention to reconstruct the logical space in which Fichte could 
discover his “thetical judgment” and Hegel could inaugurate negation as 
the basic logical category. German Idealism was a period that elevated 
social facts to the status of principles: first, the transcendental dimension 
of morality was invented (Kant), than that of language (Herder, Hammann, 
and Humboldt), of Sittlichkeit, ethical life, and law (Fichte and Hegel), 
and, finally, even of history (Schelling and Hegel). A new range of truth 
values was introduced which contaminated the immediate reality with 
the forms of social bonds, language structures, inter-subjective antagon-
isms, and historical processes, and this new “truth” was no longer ascer-
tainable by the principles of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, 
or sufficient reason. Suddenly, the phenomena rose to the surface at which 
the reductionist methods of rationalism and empiricism found themselves 
to be at the loss of words. From this historical perspective, Hegel’s begin-
ning the Logic with being and nothing also represents a radical rupture 
with the Parmenidean and Aristotelian ontology of identity and non-
contradiction, as well as with the Cartesian and Leibnizian ontology of 
7  Abstract negation is, however, not a model for all other negations, such as dia-
lectical, concrete, determinate negation, negation of negation etc.
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the cause having at least as much reality as the effect. In the realm of 
Spirit, history, culture, law, there is no less nothing than there is being 
and an effect can have a greater amount of reality than its cause. The price 
to be paid for this “inter-subjectivization of reality” is thus the sacrifice 
of the great cosmic priority of being: when two people face each other, 
nothing turns out to be just as primary and fundamental as being, and 
the abstract, excessive negation proves to be even truer than any mater ial 
causality. It is only in this new world that the pure emergence of being 
and nothing, their absolute surplus and abstract immediacy, can figure 
as its beginning.
However, by interpreting being and nothing as two “fundamentals” of 
the “logical space of inter-subjectivity”, as abstractions of two subject-
positions, we do not thereby propose a thesis on the entire structure and 
progress of The Science of Logic. The following categories of “Being”, such 
as existence, something and an other, restriction and the ought, one and 
many, repulsion and attraction, quantitative relations of direct, inverse 
ratio, and ratio of powers, chemical elective affinities, etc., will recapitu-
late some sort of inventory of the then existing scientific knowledge: the 
initially simple and abstract elements will differentiate in the increas-
ingly complex physical, chemical, arithmetic, and algebraic entities. 
Thus, in our reading, being and nothing do not constitute a matrix for 
the subsequent development of pure thought. At the utmost, they rep-
resent the introductory “bottleneck”, a narrowing of the conditions for 
the admission of forms that could henceforth be deemed “logical”.
In this view, being and nothing embody the abstract negation, the most 
rudimentary of all negations, the zero point of Hegel’s logical operations. 
In its first appearance, “negation” means nothing more than the need for 
the other subject to say “no”, so that our own proposition could be de-
tached from the usual descriptive, intentional, communicative purposes 
of speech, thereby risking the “semantic death” and establishing itself as 
a pure positing of being. At the most elemental level, being and nothing 
stand for the decision to think pure thought. Traditionally, the subject of 
philosophy has always been conceived as a subject of biographical eternity, 
a subject of continually growing knowledge, of asymptotic approach to 
reality, of infinite moral tasks, of conquering new lands. Hegel, on the 
other hand, erected a stage where the new logic of being and nothing 
drives a wedge into these stretches of “bad infinities”: the two subjects 
meet face to face, eyeball to eyeball, and behind their backs the solid lines 
of their biographies crumble into dust. Only within this “inter-subjective 
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closure” will the abstract negation break off and suspend the positive 
continuity of subjective interests and reasons, and the pure thought of 
logic will become possible.
Finally, let us conclude with pointing out that Hegel’s “mere not” was not 
some esoteric peculiarity of his, but, at the time, this contradictory and 
unreasonable logical form became almost a matter of style. Arguably the 
most famous scene of the entire Romantic literature is the first conversa-
tion between Faust and Mephistopheles in Goethe’s monumental play. 
The same status that Hamlet’s dictum “To be or not to be, that is the 
question” enjoys in the Renaissance literature, the already cited Mephis-
topheles’s adage “Ich bin der Geist, der stets verneint” occupies in Roman-
ticism. The Renaissance monologue was replaced by the Romantic dia-
logue, but the interlocutor, Mephistopheles, has nothing of substance 
to say except to embody the void, formal, abstract negativity, the mere 
Verneinung of whatever Faust has stated. It is this most abstract dialo gical 
structure which may provide us with the shortest definition of Romanti-
cism: it is the period of included contradiction without any reason. And 
it appears that Hegel opened his Logic precisely with this knot in which 
contradiction coincides with the lack of reason by virtue of being and 
nothing relating to each other solely in the form of the “mere not”.
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Jure Simoniti
Hegelova Logika kao prikaz Boga sa kraja sveta
Rezime
U član ku se po ku ša va re kon stru i sa ti lo gič ki pro stor u ko jem je na po čet ku 
He ge lo ve Lo gi ke bi la mo gu ća po ja va i ime no va nje „bi ća“ i „ni če ga“. U ne mač-
kom ide a li zmu se sa Kan tom i Fih te om po jam „bi ća“ po či nje ve zi va ti za 
for mu re če ni ce. Fih te osni va no vu isti ni to snu vred nost na ap so lut noj te zi 
„te tič ne pre su de“. Pr va te za je da He gel „bi će“ ne bi mo gao po sta vi ti na po-
če tak ne kog si ste ma, a da nje gov lo gič ki pro stor ni su pre to ga for mi ra li upra-
vo oni mi sa o ni po kre ti ne mač kog ide a li zma, ko ji su zna li mi sli ti on to lo šku 
funk ci ju pre su de. Isto vre me no, ap strakt na ne ga ci ja, od su stvo od no sa iz me đu 
„bi ća“ i „ni če ga“, pri ka zu je struk tu ru ire duk ti bil nog dvoj nog po čet ka. Lo gič ku 
po za di nu ove iz vor ne dvoj no sti či ni te o rij ski pro na la zak tran scen den tal ne 
in ter su bjek tiv no sti u ne mač kom ide a li zmu, ko ji se na pri mer ma ni fe stu je u 
He ge lo voj bor bi za ži vot i smrt iz me đu dve sa mo sve sti. Dru ga te za sto ga 
tvr di, da su „bi će“ i „ni šta“ dva tre nut ka lo gič kog pro sto ra, ko ji se svo joj kon-
kret no sti lan si ra kroz so ci jal nu si tu a ci ju (ba rem) dva su bjek ta, od ko jih je dan 
nu di afir ma tiv nu pre su du, dok dru gi istu sa mo ap strakt no ne gi ra. Iz to ga se 
mo gu ocr ta ti ko or di na te sfe re ko ja no si ime jav nost, a či ja struk tu ra pred vi đa 
uki da nje dva naj va žni ja mi sa o na za ko na lo gič kog mi šlje nja: prin cip ne pro ti v-
reč no sti i prin cip do volj nog raz lo ga. Ti me do ka zu je mo ka ko se na vrh hi je-
rar hi je jav ne per cep ci je i na taj na čin stvar no ga dru štve nog uti ca ja pop nu 
sa mo iz ja ve ko je u svom sa dr ža ju ap sor bu ju ap strakt nu re če nič nu ne ga ci ju, 
da kle iz ja ve ko je su u sta nju da pre u zmu isto vre me nu ko eg zi sten ci ju afir-
ma ci je i si me trič ne, ap strakt ne ne ga ci je svog sa dr ža ja.
Ključ ne re či: He gel, bi će, ni šta, ne ga ci ja, Lu man, in ter su bjek tiv nost, jav nost
